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Abstract 
We present a socio-human cognitive framework that radically deemphasizes the role of individual 
human agents required for both the formation of social systems and their ongoing operation thereafter. 
Our point of departure is Simondon’s (1992) theory of individuation, which we integrate with the 
enactive theory of cognition (Di Paolo et al., 2010) and Luhmann’s (1996) theory of social systems. 
This forges a novel view of social systems as complex, individuating sequences of communicative 
interactions that together constitute distributed yet distinct cognitive agencies, acquiring a capacity to 
exert influence over their human-constituted environment. We conclude that the resulting framework 
suggests several different paths of integrating AI agents into human society. One path suggests the 
emulation of a largely simplified version of the human mind, reduced in its functions to a specific 
triple selection-making which is necessary for sustaining social systems. Another one conceives AI 
systems that follow the distributed, autonomous architecture of social systems, instead that of humans.  
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1 Introduction 
 In attempting to artificially emulate human cognition, one should not underestimate the degree to 
which cognitive activities are influenced (for better or worse) by the emergence and evolution of 
modern social systems. In this paper we argue that the latter operate as sui generis cognitive systems - 
autonomous, self-organizing loci of agency and cognition, which are distinct from human minds and 
manifesting behaviors that are irreducible to their aggregations. Though not biologically embodied, 
the manner these agencies individuate and their mode of operation is analogous to many other self-
organizing processes of life. 
Procedia Computer Science
Volume 88, 2016, Pages 15–20
7th Annual International Conference on Biologically Inspired
Cognitive Architectures, BICA 2016
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Scientiﬁc Programme Committee of BICA 2016
c© The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
15
  
We believe that while the most researched paths towards AI/AGI development address the 
fundamental aspects of the cognitive architecture of an individual human mind, they still amount to a 
somewhat narrow conception of cognition. We wish to present here a different, complementary 
perspective of cognition, one which originates from a sociological systemic view. From there, we 
derive a framework for a socio-human cognitive architecture that radically deemphasizes and 
simplifies the role of individual human agents required for both the formation of social systems and 
their ongoing operation thereafter. Naturally, the resulting view of the functioning of human agents as 
facilitators of social systems, is as partial as the one that focuses on individual minds. It may however 
open a potentially faster route for implementing AI systems able to generate outcomes comparable to 
those that are achievable for contemporary human agents in the context of social systems. 
Our explication is based on Niklas Luhmann’s (1996, 2002, 2012) theory of social systems, which 
we link with the ancient Heraklitian view of reality as ontologically constituted of processes instead of 
objects and with Gilbert Simondon’s (1992) theory of individuation. This results in an understanding 
of social systems as complex sequences of occurrences of communication, which are capable of 
becoming consolidated to the degree in which they start to display an emergent adaptive dynamics 
characteristic to cognitive systems - and to exert influence over their own mind-constituted 
environment. 
2 Individuation of Cognitive Agents  
In our understanding of social systems as cognitive systems we shift from an object-oriented 
Aristotelian ontology to a process-oriented one, moving away from individuals as primary ontological 
elements whereas all transformations are secondary, to individuation (Simondon, 1992; Weinbaum & 
Veitas, 2016, 2016a) as the primary ontological (or more accurately ontogenetic) element. 
Individuation is a process where the boundaries and distinctions that define individuals arise without 
assuming any individual that precedes them. Individuation is a primary formative activity whereas 
individuals are regarded as merely intermediate and metastable entities, undergoing a continuous 
process of change. 
In this view, the individual undergoes a continuous process of transformation and is always 
pregnant with not yet actualized and not yet known potentialities of change. According to Simondon, 
an individual is not the rigidly well defined Aristotelian element with a priori given properties, but a 
plastic entity, an on-going becoming. In (Weinbaum & Veitas, 2016a) the authors discuss in length the 
mechanisms of individuation and specifically how local and contingent interactions progressively 
achieve higher degrees of coordination among initially disparate elements and by that bring forth 
complex individuated entities with agential capabilities. 
We argue that individuation can be understood as  a general process of cognitive development once 
we consider cognition as a process of sense-making that facilitates spontaneous boundary and 
distinction formation. This approach is supported by the theory of enactive cognition that sees in 
sense-making the primary activity of cognition (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1992; Stewart, Gapenne, 
& Di Paolo, 2010; De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007). 
We follow this notion but introduce the more radical idea that sense-making is the bringing forth 
of a world of distinctions, objects and entities and the relations among them. In that, sense-making 
precedes both subjects and objects and is necessary to their emergence. In this very sense we draw the 
line that associates sense-making to individuation: sense-making thus understood, precedes the 
existence of consolidated cognitive agents to whom the activity of sense-making would be 
conventionally attributed. Even though there is `nobody there’ as yet in the conventional sense, 
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processes of individuation constitute a distributed and progressively more coherent (as boundaries and 
distinctions are formed) loci of autonomous cognitive activity. Individuation is thus a general process 
of cognitive development taken out from its relatively narrow psychological context and projected 
into the much broader context of general systems. Sense-making entails crossing the boundary 
between the unknown and the known through the formation of tentative perceptions and actions 
consolidating them together into more or less stable conceptions. 
Individuation as an on-going formative process, manifests in the co-determining interactions 
taking place within heterogeneous populations of interacting agents. These populations are the “raw 
materials” from which new individuals emerge. The sense-making activities are distributed over the 
population and have no center of regulated activity or synchrony. Coordination - the recurrent mutual 
regulation of behaviors is achieved via interactions that are initially contingent. These interactions are 
necessary for the consolidation of any organized entity or system. We see then a strong parallel 
between cognitive development and individuation bringing forth actual agents --be them biological 
organisms, social systems, AIs, or any other. Consequently, in this very broad sense that we find 
particularly attractive in the context of transdisciplinary research we can assign cognitive agential 
competences to general systems applicable to diverse categories and scales.  
3 Social Systems as Cognitive Individuals 
We can now apply this rationale to social systems. By a ‘social system’ we mean here any 
metastable form of social activity --such as organizations, projects, social movements, economies, 
governments, states, religious organizations, cultural organizations, discourses, narratives, linguistic 
activities such as conversations, stories, reports etc. Using Luhmann’s theory of social systems as our 
point of departure, we will a) demonstrate the individuation of social systems, i.e. the sense-making 
activity that brings them forth, and b) identify social systems as the metastable individuals that they 
are. This will support our thesis that social systems can be considered as loci of cognitive activity or in 
other words as distributed cognitive agents. 
According to the Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems (2002, 2012) events which forge the 
social reality happen as single occurrences of communication, while each such occurrence is 
combination of three difference-making selections: (a) a selection of information, (b) a selection of the 
utterance of (a form to carry out) that information and (c) a selection of understanding of that 
utterance (Luhmann, 2002:157). 
Once such three selections have been made as combined together, they form a unity of a 
communicative event, which temporarily becomes an individual by itself. This means that it 
distinguishes itself from its environment (i.e. any other processes or events) by the means of three 
provisional boundaries, which the event sets forth: a) an ‘information-making boundary’ between the 
marked and unmarked sides of a distinction being made (Spencer-Brown, 1994), i.e. delineating the 
selected information (marked - M) and the non-selected one (unmarked - Un-M), (b) a ‘semiotic 
boundary’ (Lotman, 2001) between the thus created signified (SD) and a particular signifier (SR) 
selected to carry the information, and (c) a ‘sense-making boundary’ between thus created sign (SGN) 
and the context (CX), i.e. delineating the understanding of information within its situation 
(Lenartowicz, Weinbaum & Braathen, 2016).  
The three selections and corresponding boundaries of an event make the communication available to 
interact with or to be referred to by another communicative event constituted by another triple 
selection. E.g., the inside of a distinction may select another marked and unmarked side of an 
information boundary in another instance of a communicative event; the form that was selected as an 
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utterance may be reused in the future, or may be referred to as the selected information; the context 
side of the sense-making boundary may be re-selected in the understanding of a following 
communication, etc. 
Once recorded or remembered, all communicative events and all selections become endlessly 
available to be referred to, independently of their proximity in location or time of utterance. This 
allows them to freely interrelate in a variety of ways that give rise to the emergence of countless 
transient, original sequences and configurations. However, closed networks of communication, which 
are typical to humans, are likely to tighten the intertwining and associative relations of communicative 
events to such a degree that they converge into self-reinforcing recurrent sequences (Lenartowicz, 
2016). Once stabilized, such assembled sequences may become quite difficult not to be related to by 
following specific instances of communication, even if in a form of negation, or critique. Thus, out of 
ephemeral instances of single primitive communicative events, complex individuated sequences and 
patterns arise. We call such individuals social systems and we consider the process of their self-
organization to be a clear case of individuation as described in section 2 (Lenartowicz, Weinbaum & 
Braathen, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 1: (A.) A single occurrence of communication and (B.) self-organization of a sequence of communication 
 
By repeatedly referring and being referred to (with some degree of variation) the elements of 
social systems maintain both continuity and coherence while they undergo a continuous individuation. 
Coherence is maintained and reinforced due to distinction-based composition: since, while recurring, a 
sequence of communications repeats (with high probability) its previous selections, in a manner 
similar to the dynamics of Markovian processes. Boundaries that are initially contingent, become 
reinforced and stabilized. On account of their repetition, a social system can be said to develop 
perceptions (i.e. reappearing selections of information and understanding), actions (i.e. reappearing 
selections of utterance) and conceptions (percept – action associations) that dynamically bind them. 
Each such assemblage thus becomes a locus of identifiable cognitive activity, temporarily stabilized 
within a flux of communication. 
4 The Role of Human Cognition 
The selections needed for a social system to individuate i.e. the three selections of information, of 
utterance, and of understanding, are all performed by other individuated cognitive systems, namely: 
1. Information 
2. Utterance 
3. Understanding 
M   Un-M 
SR       SD 
  SG      CX 
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human beings. Once a certain degree of coherence of the social system is achieved, this activity is 
nudged by the internal pattern of that system, which orients and guides the human-made selections. 
The mental environment provided by humans actively facilitates the further individuation of the 
system by searching for and/or initiating new instances of communication that promote clarity, 
coherence and the determination of yet undetermined details in previous communications. 
The necessity of the engagement of human cognition and actions may call into question both the 
actual agency, which we attribute to social systems, and the appropriateness of the concepts of self-
organization and individuation being applied to them. However, it must be emphasized that the power 
of influence of a single human individual over the social organization she is part of is always relative 
and dynamic. Whether water will wash a seedling out, or will be consumed towards its growth, is 
contingent on the relative difference of their mass and capacity. By analogy, an individual person, 
who may normally be capable of generating an unprecedented occurrence of communication, is 
typically much less capable, or incapable at all, of being oblivious and restraining from contributing to 
the production of a fully blown, massive social system, such as a culture, an economy, a discourse, or 
a paradigm. The reason lies in the relative difference of strength between the two individuals: human 
and social. When the social system is at the very beginning of its potential individuation, consisting of 
a single, hardly contextualized occurrence of communication, the human individual may freely 
influence its shape. But when the social system becomes massive and its pattern is confirmed by an 
immense number of other communications, selections made by the same person are much more likely 
to simply follow the groove. Additionally, if a single selection does not follow the pattern, typically it 
will neither stop the operations of the system, nor reorganize it. The overwhelming presence of other 
instances of communication that do follow will suffice for it to continue. It is the power of large 
numbers and memetic imitation that helps to consolidate the social system. 
Taking into account a variety of powerful factors that guide all the linguistic activities of humans: 
(a) the relative simplicity, associative coherence, frequent recurrence of the cognitive operations once 
they become consolidated in a social system (b) the rarity of context-free (e.g. completely exploratory 
and poetic) communications that is reinforced by the density and entanglement of all “language 
games” in which contemporary humans are all immersed in, and (c) the high level of predictability of 
human selection-making inputs observable from the sociological standpoint; it will be reasonable to 
set the boundaries of our modeling of the general phenomena of human cognition in such a way, 
which delineates the dynamics of two different kinds of individuating cognitive agencies operating at 
different scales: the human individual and the social system. Instead of reducing all cognitive 
activities to the human individual we can clearly distinguish cognitive agencies operating at different 
scales. 
5 Conclusion 
Taking into account the strength of the influence that the cognitive operations of social systems are 
capable of exerting on the cognitive operations of humans, as well as the relative simplicity of the role 
of the humans once it becomes reduced to the triple selection-making, it seems worth to explore the 
possibility that in the attempt to replicate human cognition in AI systems a similar split architecture 
could be introduced. 
While the implication that individual human beings compliantly follow patterns laid out by social 
systems may invoke resentment or even denial, a similar degree of socially induced amenability might 
prove desirable, if displayed in robots. Provided that a deliberate consensual choice can be made in 
respect to the kinds of social systems which would be beneficial to humans and human communities 
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in general, an artificial cognitive architecture designed specifically to follow the operations of social 
systems could probably minimize the threat of AI systems becoming “too creative” or “too 
independent” and thus posing a threat from the perspective of human societies. 
Yet, the interpretation of social systems as individuating cognitive systems opens up possibilities 
other than just the one of designing AI as contributors of the triple selection-making. Another 
interesting possibility is to conceive AI systems that follow the distributed architecture of social 
systems, instead of that of individual human cognition. In this approach an intelligent artificial 
architecture would be envisaged as a self-organizing cloud of occurrences of communication, which 
seeks self-consolidation and expansion via opening up of triple selection-making opportunities for 
other agents: humans, software systems or machines. Seen from this perspective, and taking into 
account the open-ended nature of individuation and evolution, it is conceivable that such an 
individuating system may emerge out of any simple autonomous organization. 
And, clearly, in the most sophisticated and unpredictable implementation both paths would be 
followed simultaneously: designing a multi-scale AI system that involves both the individual and 
social perspectives we explored. Artificial systems could be designed to implement both the selection 
making populations of individual agents and a selection-constituted distributed systems -- a complete 
artificial social reality might thus be created. 
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